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"The amazing lesson from this depression is that no one knows
much about the real causes and e⁄ects of ANYTHING." W. M.
Kiplinger, ￿nancial expert.
What caused the Great Depression in the United States? Contrary to the
ongoing critique on the Economics profession for not having anticipated the
Global Financial Crisis, the macroeconomics community over the past decade
has produced extensive work on other major depressions. In particular, in
recent years, there has been a resurgence in interest in the Great Depression.
This work was initiated by Cole and Ohanian (1999) who have entertained
the idea that the economic disaster stemmed from real supply shocks such as
innovations or changes in regulations. Others like Bordo, Erceg and Evans
(2000) have considered monetary factors such as price trends, interest rates
and monetary policy. And in Harrison and Weder (2006) and Weder (2001,
2006) a decline in aggregate spending has formed the foundation of analysis.
These varied approaches have two central ideas in common: (i) they apply
dynamic general equilibrium modelling, and (ii) they calibrate models and
use these calibrated models to generate arti￿cial data that are then compared
with actual data.
Nevertheless, there is still no general agreement about the causes of the
Great Depression in the United States. This paper contributes to the debate
contrasting competing theories of the business cycle. In particular, I am
going to examine and compare a real business cycle approach which focusses
on supply disturbances with another model which puts shifts in real demand
at the centerstage. By running a Fair and Shiller-like (1990) test, some new
insights regarding these theories￿e¢ cacy to explain US interwar business
cycles will be provided.
Before looking at these arti￿cial economies, it is worthwhile to restate
some facts about the Great Depression in the United States which will be
critical when evaluating the theories. Figure 1 presents US per capita GDP
from 1889 to 2006 (original source of data: Kendrick, 1961, Maddison, 1991
and NIPA). The Figure also plots the ￿tted long run trend and cyclical devi-
ations from this estimated trend. The residuals constitute what is generally
understood as business cycle ￿ uctuations. These ￿ uctuations, and the inter-
war years in particular, are the focus of the present paper. The lower part
of Figure 1 shows that GDP per capita fell by about 40 percent from trend
between 1929 and 1933 and it suggests that the US economy failed to recover
until the outbreak of the Second World War. In fact, (detrended) 1939 GDP
was some twenty percent lower than that of 1929 (This tepid recovery turns
2out to be very problematic to explain.) Furthermore, the US economy expe-
rienced another big recession during 1937-38 ￿the third largest in the 20th
century.
In the next three Sections, I will outline how two competing ideas of
business cycles are able to account for these Depression facts.
Figure 1 about here
2 Supply shocks
It is well known that the real business cycle model performs fairly well in ex-
plaining postwar US business cycles. The idea to look at historical episodes
and, in particular, to confront real business cycle theory and the Great De-
pression stems from Cole and Ohanian (1999). They took a plain vanilla
real business cycle model o⁄ the shelf and tested the hypothesis of if the
Great Depression had been caused by negative technology shocks. Cole and
Ohanian￿ s idea is not trivial. Figure 2 plots the path of US total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) from 1892 to 1941 (original source of data: Kendrick, 1961).
The Figure￿ s lower graph shows the percentage deviations of TFP from the
prewar trend. TFP deteriorated after 1928, and from 1929 to 1933, there
was a near-twenty percent drop in TFP. Hence, everything boils down to if
a drop of this size if su¢ cient to have created the Great Depression.






t [logct + ￿ log(1 ￿ ht)]:
Here ct denotes consumption, ht stands for hours worked and ￿ is the discount
factor. 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0. Physical capital accumulation is described by
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + yt ￿ ct
where kt is the capital stock and ￿ its constant rate of physical depreciation.






to produce output yt; zt is a random variable that shifts the production func-
tion, i.e. cyclical TFP. TFP which will be the only driving force in this
model. 0 < ￿ < 1. All markets are perfectly competitive and they clear
3at all times. Then a series of technology shocks (like the one reported in
the lower panel of Figure 2) is fed into the model to generate a sequence
of arti￿cial GDP. The real business cycle story encapsulates the ￿rst years
of the Great Depression fairly well: arti￿cial GDP falls from 1929 through
to 1933 and the economy turns around sometime in 1933 before recovering.
The predicted free-fall of output is about half as deep as US GDP, hence, a
large portion of the Depression can be explained. More problematic, how-
ever, is the very tepid recovery of the US economy. The model simply cannot
replicate the slow process of recovery: the arti￿cial GDP swiftly returns to
trend by 1935. The reason behind this failure is the rapid rise of TFP, which
hovers signi￿cantly above its long-run average from 1935 onwards (see Figure
2). In the arti￿cial real business cycles economy, this TFP pattern translates
into a counterfactual boom during the second half of the thirties. (Mone-
tary models in the footsteps of Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, face a parallel
conundrum as is shown by Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 2000, who simulated a
sticky price model which suggests that expansionary policies by the Federal
Reserve after 1932 should have induced a quickly rebounding economy.) In
a view initially formulated by Wanniski (1979), Cole and Ohanian (2004)
have moved towards a more agnostic view of what productivity distortions
stand-in for. In particular, they analyze the wedges created by institutional
changes arising from New Deal cartelization policies, and they suggest that
this improves matters as now their model explains much of the second half of
the 1930s. Nevertheless, their technology-driven model misses the 1937-1938
recession.
Figure 2 about here
3 Will the real demand shock please stand
up?
In this Section, I will approach the Great Depression from a di⁄erent per-
spective.1 My point of departure is Temin￿ s (1976) emphasis on contractions
of real aggregate demand beginning with the market crash and continuing
through the ￿rst years of the thirties. Temin￿ s argument rests on an episodic
pattern of consumption which bears no resemblance to that of other reces-
sions. He reports that consumption fell by a whopping 5.4 percent from
1929 to 1930 ￿a unique fall compared to other economic downturns. For
example, during the 1920-1921 recession, consumption had increased by 6.4
1This Section draws on Weder (2001, 2006).
4percent. Temin identi￿es large negative residuals from estimated Keynesian
consumption functions for the onset of the Great Depression, and stresses
that investment took similar sudden hits. (Gordon and Veitch, 1986, provide
additional support for Temin￿ s position.). In an old-fashioned interpreta-
tion, Temin classi￿es these residuals as the collapse of autonomous spending.
Temin￿ s original formulation remains within the con￿nes of the old Key-
nesian apparatus. In contrast, my model is framed within methodological
standards that are set and met by the real business cycle approach. The
model applies Temin￿ s interpretation to a fully articulated dynamic general
equilibrium framework in which only demand shocks drive economic ￿ uctua-
tions. If the Great Depression was such an equilibrium, the model should be
able to replicate the behavior of key macroeconomic aggregates during that
time.
The intriguing aspect of this approach is that it takes the basic real
business cycle model as a point of departure while considering only one minor
alteration: the representative household has period utility of the form
log(ct ￿ ￿t) + ￿ log(1 ￿ ht)
where ￿t alters preferences to allow for shifts to the marginal utility of con-
sumption ￿a taste shock or a real demand shock.2 The household￿ s optimal





from which, since data for consumption, hours works and real wage, wt, are
available, a sequence of demand shocks can be backed out (original wage
data taken from Hanes, 1996). In fact, this concept is much like the Solow
(1957) residual. The dynamics for ￿t are best described by a low order
autoregressive process.
From the Euler equation (1), one is able to identify a series of unusu-
ally large pervasive shifts in demand that hit the US economy post-1929.
(Weder, 2001, conducted a battery of causality tests and found that nei-
ther monetary nor ￿scal variables stand behind these disturbances.) These
shocks correspond to Temin￿ s account of a drop in aggregate demand. I feed
these measured demand shocks into the outlined dynamic general equilib-
rium model. Figure 3 plots detrended US GDP and the arti￿cially generated
output series (1929=100). To show that the model￿ s predictive power is not
limited to the Great Depression, I report the complete interwar years of the
simulation. A few aspects come to light. First, the size and sequence of
2See also Baxter and King (1991) and Hall (1986).
5shocks can generate a pattern of the model GDP that is not unlike data:
the arti￿cial economy is able to account for almost all of the decline in eco-
nomic activity. Secondly, it is also able to exaggerate a realistic pattern of
persistence as both the slow recovery as well as the 1937-38 recessions are
replicated. Thirdly, the arti￿cial economy￿ s trough is one year too late ￿
probably the e⁄ect of the New Deal. Fourthly, Figure 3 also shows that de-
mand shocks drove a lion￿ s share of the boom during the twenties as well as
the 1920-21 Depression. And lastly, but not shown here, Weder (2006) has
reported that by adding variable capital utilization and modestly increas-
ing returns to scale in the production technology, the demand-driven model
can endogenously replicate most of the path of data TFP. Hence, the real
business cycle model is contained as a special part within the demand-driven
economy.
Figure 3 about here
4 Supply versus demand
So far this analysis has followed the existing literature and has simply eval-
uated success via "aesthetic R2s". We have seen that there appears to be
support for both approaches, so this Section will apply a test that aims to
discern model performances. Here I follow Fair and Shiller (1990) who check
the forecasting ability of various econometric models by evaluating the infor-
mation content of endogenous model output through the lens of a regression.
Table 1 about here
In particular, I apply their test to assess the information contained in the
supply-driven and in the demand-driven models￿forecasts. It is well known
that time series econometrics allows data to be distinguished in atheoretical
ways. For example, modelling aggregate output as a low-order autoregressive
or moving-average process generates reasonable ￿ts. Now, if any of the two
theories bear anything unique about the US economy, they must bestow
some advantages relative to atheoretical time series models. I implement
this investigation by estimating equations of the following form
lny
US












t denotes linearly-detrended per capita US GDP (20th century trend)
and ym
t stands for simulated model output. The idea behind conducting these
6tests is that by adding output from the models to the regression, one obtains
a measure of to what extent supply and demand shocks respectively provide
additional informational content. I begin with the autoregressive model.
Data covers 1919-1941. A lag length of n = 1 was chosen since other lags are










Table 1 shows that the time series model explains over 79 percent of the
variation in output one year hence. So, to what extent do the model real-
izations provide additional informational content? Table 1 reports that both
considered models contain incremental explanatory power on output. The
standard errors of the regressions fall, and the probability that the explana-
tory power is produced by pure chance is essentially nil (see the p-values of
the F-statistic and the log likelihood ratio in Regressions 2 and 3). If any-
thing there exists a slight advantage in favor of the demand driven model:
R
2
rises by more (i.e. the informational content appears to be larger), and
actual lagged US output is no longer signi￿cant at the fourteen percent level.
Next, I next add both models simultaneously to the regression. This is re-
ported in Regression 1 in Table 2. Again, both models contribute signi￿cantly
as indicated by the t-statistics (since actual data would no longer be signi￿-
cant, I have omitted it). However, if I consider the Twenties (Regression 2)
and Thirties (Regression 3) separately, the picture changes somewhat. It now
appears that the Roaring Twenties were predominantly driven by demand
shocks: the real business cycles￿regression coe¢ cient becomes negative and
insigni￿cant. Finally, a mix of supply and demand shifts can explain almost
all of the Great Depression (R
2
approaches one in Regression 4).3 Overall,
this analysis suggests that both supply and demand driven models contribute
to our understanding of the Great Depression.
Table 2 about here
5 Conclusion
There exists still no general agreement about the causes of the Great De-
pression in the United States. In this paper two dynamic general equilibrium
economies compete in explaining the US interwar business cycles. The analy-
sis remains inconclusive with respect to which theory performs better; it is
too close to call a clear winner.
3This parallels the Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) claim that almost all of the
Great Depression can be explained by e¢ ciency and labor wedges.
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Figure 1: US per capita GDP, 1889-2006, logarithmic scale The lower part
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Figure 2: US TFP, 1892-1941, logarithmic scale The lower part of the Figure
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Regression results (h = 0)
Regression Variable Coe¢ cient R
2
S.E.R. F-statistic Log likelihood
(t-value) (variable) ratio








0.871 0.0551 0.0031 0.0011
S.E.R. = standard errors of regression, last two columns test for redundant
variables: test statistics are the F-statistic and the Log likelihood ratio (￿2); prob-
ability values reported.
13Table 2
Regression results (h = 0)
Regression Variable Coe¢ cient R
2
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